Selection from Divine Providence ~ Emanuel Swedenborg
Whatever a man does from freedom, whether it be of reason or not, provided it is in accordance with his reason, appears to him to be his.What rationality and liberty, which are peculiar to man, are, can be most clearly understood by a comparison of man with beasts.
For beasts have no rationality or ability to understand, and no liberty or ability to will freely; consequently they have no understanding or will, but in place of understanding they have knowledge, and in place of will they have affection, both of which are natural. And as they do not possess these two faculties, they have no thought, but in place of thought they have an internal sight which makes one by correspondence with their external sight.
Every affection has its mate which is like a spouse; affection from natural love has knowledge, affection from spiritual love understanding, and affection from celestial love wisdom. For an affection without its mate as a spouse is not any thing; it is as being (esse) without coming forth (existere), or as substance without form, of which nothing can be predicated. Therefore, in every thing created there is something that is referable to the marriage of good and truth, as has been shown above in many places. In beasts there is a marriage of affection and knowledge, the affection in them pertaining to natural good, and knowledge to natural truth.Since, then, affection and knowledge in beasts act completely as one, and their affection cannot be raised above their knowledge nor their knowledge above their affection, but whenever raised are both raised together, and since they have no spiritual mind, into which, or into the light and heat of which, they can be raised, therefore they have no capacity to understand, that is, rationality, and no capacity to will freely, that is, liberty; they have merely natural affection with its knowledge. The natural affection that they possess is an affection for providing themselves food, shelter, and offspring, and for escaping or avoiding injury, with all requisite knowledge of these things. Such being the state of their life, they have no ability to think, This I wish or do not wish; this I know or do not know; or still less, this I understand, and this I love; but from their affection by means of their knowledge they are borne along without rationality or liberty. They are so borne along, not from the natural world, but from the spiritual. For there is nothing in the natural world unconnected with the spiritual world. From that world is every cause that produces an effect.
With man it is otherwise. He has not only affection from natural love, but also affection from spiritual love, and affection from celestial love. For the human mind is of three degrees. ... Consequently a man can be raised up from natural knowledge into spiritual intelligence and from that into celestial wisdom; and from these two, intelligence and wisdom, he can look to the Lord, and thus be conjoined with Him, whereby he lives forever. But this exaltation in respect to affection would not be possible unless man had from rationality an ability to raise the understanding, and from liberty an ability to will this.
By means of these two faculties man has the ability to reflect within himself upon those things that he perceives outside of himself by means of the bodily senses. He also has the ability to think above about what he is thinking below. For one can say: This I have thought and this I now think; also: This I have willed and this I now will; or again: This I understand to be true, this I love because it is such; and so on. From this it is clear that man thinks also above thought, seeing it as if beneath him. This ability man has from rationality and from liberty — from rationality this capacity for higher thought — from liberty the capacity to will, from affection to so think. For without the liberty so to think he would not have the will, and consequently not the thought.
For this reason those that have no wish to understand any thing except what pertains to the world and its nature, and no wish to understand what moral and spiritual good and truth are, cannot be raised from knowledge into intelligence, still less into wisdom; for they have closed up these capacities, and therefore make themselves to be men no further than having an ability to understand, if they will, and an ability to so will, from the rationality and liberty implanted in them. From these two faculties man is able to think, and to speak from thought; in all other things men are not men but beasts; and some, from the abuse of these faculties are worse than beasts.
From an unobscured rationality any one can see or comprehend that it is only from an appearance that it is his that man can be in any affection for knowing, or in any affection for understanding. For every enjoyment and pleasure, and therefore every thing of the will, is from affection, which belongs to love. Who can wish to know any thing or to understand any thing, unless he has some pleasure from affection? And who can possess this pleasure of affection unless that which moves the affection appears to be his? If nothing were his, but everything another's, in other words, if any one from his own affections should pour something into the mind of another who had no affection for knowing and understanding as if from himself, would the other receive it, or even possess the ability to receive it? Would he not be like what is called a dullard and a stock?
From this it is clearly evident that although every thing that man perceives, and thinks and knows therefrom, and wills and does in accordance with the perception, flows into him, nevertheless it is made by the Lord's Divine providence to appear to be man's; for otherwise, as has been said, the man could receive nothing, and therefore he could be endowed with no understanding or wisdom. It is acknowledged that every thing good and true is the Lord's and not man's, and yet that it appears to man to be his; and because every thing good and true so appears, all things of the church and of heaven, consequently all things of love and wisdom, and of charity and faith, so appear, and yet nothing of these is man's. Unless it appeared to man that he perceived these things as if from himself, he could not receive them from the Lord. From all this the truth of the matter can be seen, namely, that whatever one does from freedom, whether it be of reason or not, provided it is in accordance with his reason, appears to him to be his.
With his faculty called rationality who is not able to understand that this or that good is useful to society, and that this or that evil is harmful to it; for example, that justice, sincerity, and the chastity of marriage, are useful to society, and that injustice, insincerity, and adulterous relations with the wives of others, are harmful to it; consequently, that these evils in themselves are injuries, and that the goods in themselves are benefits? Who therefore is not able, if he will, to make these distinctions matters of reason? He has rationality, and he has liberty; and so far as he, for these reasons, shuns these evils in himself, are his rationality and liberty uncovered and made manifest, and so far do they regulate, and give perception and ability; and so far as this is done man looks to these goods as a friend looks to his friends.
From all this man is able afterwards from his faculty which is called rationality to draw conclusions about such goods as are useful to society in the spiritual world, and about the evils that are harmful there, if in place of evils he understands sins, and in place of goods works of charity. This a man is able, if he will, to make a matter of his reason also, since he has rationality and liberty. And so far as he shuns these evils as sins, are his rationality and liberty uncovered and made manifest, and so far they regulate and give perception and ability; and so far as this is done, he looks to the goods of charity as neighbor looks to neighbor, from mutual love.
Since, then, it is the Lord's will, for the sake of reception and conjunction, that whatever a man does freely in accordance with reason should appear to him to be his, and this is in accordance with reason itself, it follows that man is able from his reason to will this on the ground that it constitutes his eternal happiness; and by the Lord's Divine power, when it is invoked, he is able to do it.
(from Divine Providence 74-77)