Acting from Freedom in Accordance with Reason

Selection from Divine Providence ~ Emanuel Swedenborg

MAN SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED BY EXTERNAL MEANS
TO THINK AND WILL AND THUS TO BELIEVE AND LOVE THE THINGS OF RELIGION
BUT SHOULD GUIDE HIMSELF AND SOMETIMES COMPEL HIMSELF

This law of the Divine providence — man should act from freedom in accordance with reason — he should do this from himself and yet from the Lord, therefore as if from himself.

Everyone admits, moreover, that it is impossible to compel any one to think what he is not willing to think, and to will what his thought forbids him to will, thus to believe what he does not believe, and wholly so what he is unwilling to believe; or to love what he does not love, and wholly so what he is unwilling to love. For a man's spirit or mind has full liberty in thinking, willing, believing, and loving. It has this liberty by influx from the spiritual world, which does not compel (for man's spirit or mind is in that world), and not by influx from the natural world, which is received only when it acts in harmony with spiritual influx.

A man may be forced to say that he thinks and wills and believes and loves the things of religion; but he does not think, will, believe, and love them unless they are matters of affection and consequent reason with him, or come to be so. Also, a man may be compelled to speak in favor of religion and to do what it inculcates; but he cannot be compelled to favor it in his thought from any belief in it, or to favor it in his will from any love for it. Moreover, in kingdoms where justice and judgment are guarded, men are compelled not to speak against religion, and to do nothing in opposition to it, and yet no one can be compelled to favor it in his thought and will. For it is within every one's freedom to think in harmony with hell and to will in favor of hell, and also to favor heaven in thought and will. But the reason teaches what hell is and what heaven is, and what the abiding condition is in the one and in the other; and it is from the reason that the will has its preference and choice.

From all this it can be seen that the external cannot compel the internal. Nevertheless, this is sometimes done; but that it is pernicious.

More to follow.

(from Divine Providence 129)